О НЕСОВМЕСТИМОСТИ ЭКСТЕРНАЛИЗМА И КАРТЕЗИАНСКОЙ МОДЕЛИ ЗНАНИЯ О СЕБЕ

Translated title of the contribution: ON THE INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN EXTERNALISM AND CARTESIAN ACCOUNT OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The paper aims to examine the compatibility problem between externalism about mental content and self-knowledge. First, I explore the main anti-compatibilist arguments and objections to them and conclude that anti-compatibilist views imply the shift from the ontological issue to the epistemic one. Second, I argue that compatibilists, in its turn, regardthis shift as unjustified. The reason for that is that they do not accept the Cartesian introspective model of self-knowledge.
Translated title of the contributionON THE INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN EXTERNALISM AND CARTESIAN ACCOUNT OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE
Original languageRussian
Pages (from-to)168-180
Number of pages13
JournalСибирский философский журнал
Volume18
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2020

GRNTI

  • 02.00.00 PHILOSOPHY

Level of Research Output

  • VAK List

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