О НЕСОВМЕСТИМОСТИ ЭКСТЕРНАЛИЗМА И КАРТЕЗИАНСКОЙ МОДЕЛИ ЗНАНИЯ О СЕБЕ

Resultado de la investigación: Articlerevisión exhaustiva

Resumen

The paper aims to examine the compatibility problem between externalism about mental content and self-knowledge. First, I explore the main anti-compatibilist arguments and objections to them and conclude that anti-compatibilist views imply the shift from the ontological issue to the epistemic one. Second, I argue that compatibilists, in its turn, regardthis shift as unjustified. The reason for that is that they do not accept the Cartesian introspective model of self-knowledge.
Título traducido de la contribuciónON THE INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN EXTERNALISM AND CARTESIAN ACCOUNT OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE
Idioma originalRussian
Páginas (desde-hasta)168-180
Número de páginas13
PublicaciónСибирский философский журнал
Volumen18
N.º2
DOI
EstadoPublished - 2020

GRNTI

  • 02.00.00 PHILOSOPHY

Level of Research Output

  • VAK List

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